The Politics of Identity in the UK: Before, During and After Covid-19 by Fagan, Andrew
The Politics of Identity in the UK: Before, During and After Covid-19 





Covid-19 is the most harmful and devastating pandemic the world has faced for over a 
century, and one hopes that biomedical science will provide the most effective clinical 
remedy to the virus in due course. When countries began to seriously pay attention to the 
rapid spread of the virus, it was commonly asserted that Covid-19 was an indiscriminate 
disease, which everyone was similarly vulnerable to, a claim which appears to be 
exemplified by the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, contracting the virus in late March 
2020.  
 
After several months of the spread of Covid-19 throughout the developed world, we now 
In stark contrast to the claim that the virus did not discriminate,  it became quickly apparent 
that the likelihood of becoming infected is far higher amongst some socio-economic, racial 
and ethnic groups than others.1 Identity is an aetiological factor in the spread of the virus. 
This is not because of the differing physiological or DNA composition of those who have 
disproportionately been infected by the virus. Biology is not destiny. Rather, those most 
likely to become infected and thus to die from the virus are also many of the poorest and 
most socially marginalised within our societies. In addition to its biomedical properties, 
Covid-19 must also be understood as a profoundly social and political pathogen, that sheds 
an unrelenting light on the social and political pathologies of affluent, notionally democratic 
societies such as the United Kingdom.   
 
This paper focuses upon two pandemics and examines the relationship between them. 
The first is, of course, Covid-19. The second, that I suggest here, consists of a form of 
identity-fuelled politics which has quic
formidable adversary in many affluent societies, including that which I shall focus upon 
here: the United Kingdom. In a chapter I wrote in December 2019, I referred to this as the 
.2 In this brief chapter, I will analyse three stages of the pandemic 
-19 pandemic. In so doing, I aim to 
analyse the pathological character of a particular form of identity politics in the UK, whilst 
also, albeit somewhat speculatively, seeking to show how Covid-19 might provide the basis 
for the human rights community and the defenders of social justice to begin politically 
disrupting key identity-based elements of the pandemic of discontent. My hope is that we 
might be able to derive some longer-term benefits from the terrible devastation which 
Covid-19 has already caused by reasserting the extent to which respect for fundamental 





1 See the paper by Caroline Bald and Sharon Walker in this volume. 
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Minority Rights and Unstable 
Orders (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2021). 
II. Before 
 
Can you still clearly recall the UK as it was before Covid-19? Lest your frustrations with life 
in the age of Covid-19 have induced a state of nostalgia for what came before, let me 
remind you: significant parts of the UK had become infected by a wider political 
consisting of a politics of identity, a particular form of identity politics was and is integral to 
this pandemic. 
 
There is a large and growing body of academic literature devoted to the study of identity 
as a central feature of the political, socio-cultural and economic distribution of rights, 
resources and opportunities within established liberal democratic societies, such as the 
USA, the UK, France, and the Netherlands.3 
equality and non-discrimination, which underpin a comprehensive body of equality and 
anti-discrimination law, many theorists, commentators and activists have repeatedly 
pointed to the multitude of ways in which formally rights-respecting, liberal democratic 
societies have failed to recognise and support the interests of groups of people whose 
avowed identity results in systematically restricting their enjoyment of equal opportunities.4 
These critiques appear in areas such as, education, employment, housing, health-care, 
gender orientation, and the ability to practice key cultural and religious traditions and 
basically just and fair character of liberal institutions and liberal societies.  
 
While advocates of identity politics are typically associated with positions on the left of the 
political spectrum, the identity-politicking components of the pandemic of discontent 
extends to include many groups towards the opposite end of that spectrum. Specifically, 
those groups that typically espouse nationalist and exclusionary causes and interests. 
While the underlying causes of right-wing populism are complex, a key element of right-
wing populist identity politicking consists of the support it enjoys amongst communities of 
people who have come to view themselves as the victims of the liberal democratic order 
5 Ironically, for many of 
its supporters,  much of the ostensive appeal of right-wing populist identity draws upon an 
experience of the ontological insecurity and vulnerability which has mobilised various 
minority communities to fight for their collective rights to exist and thrive since the 
emergence of the identity politicking age in the 1960s until the present day.6 The re-
emergence, and several eye-catching political successes, of right-wing populism freshly 
highlights the extent to which identity politics now includes groups  of people who claim 
that their own identities are increasingly vulnerable to the presumed legal, political, socio-
3 Bhiku Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2nd edition) 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
4 Ayelet Shachar,  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). Michael Kenny, The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the 
Dilemmas of Difference, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
5 Eric Kaufman, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 2019). 
6  2019, 
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-08/populism-and-nativism-2019_0.pdf; 
:  The 
Nation, 27 September 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/the-rage-of-white-folks/. 
cultural and economic rights gained by particular minority communities within societies 
such as the UK. Illiberal right-wing populism is, to a large extent, the principal political 
manifestation, or symptom, of the pandemic of discontent, which itself is seen by many as 
posing the greatest existential threat to liberal democracy.7  
 
In addition to unbridled prejudice, right-wing populism is fuelled by a wide range of 
concerns and anxieties which have emerged within the UK over the course of many years. 
The 
employment, health-care, safe and affordable housing, access to a healthy environment, 
pensions which support a dignified old age for all, adequate social security, affordable 
public transport and adequately funded local authorities, have become increasingly 
precarious and vulnerable to under-funding and reduced accountability over several 
decades.8 Many people are entirely justified in feeling that the prevailing political system 
has routinely and systematically failed them. Under more democratic circumstances, these 
conditions might have led to wholesale popular support for a progressive political platform 
committed to addressing what some identify as the principal cause of this pandemic: an 
inequitable neoliberal economic order, which has led to the relative impoverishment and 
destitution of many different groups of people who inhabit the UK. There are demonstrable 
grounds for forging an electorally powerful, multicultural constituency comprising all of 
those who the prevailing order has failed, which would include many amongst the white 
British and BAME communities who share a common exposure to an inequitable economy 
and society. Against this possibility, right-wing populist identity politicking represents, 
arguably, the most powerful obstacle to forging a transformative politics committed to 
securing equal rights and effective opportunities for all communities and individuals within 
the UK. By weaponizing racism and xenophobia, right-wing populism divides groups of 
people who, despite their differing identities, are similarly exposed to many of the same 
social, political and economic ills.   
           
As is the case with the Covid-19 pandemic, the pandemic of discontent has also 
disproportionately impacted many of the more vulnerable and marginalised communities 
within the UK.9 Racist, xenophobic and intolerant beliefs and attitudes persist within many 
liberal democracies, despite the existence of a comprehensive array of legal commitments 
and constitutional provisions designed to protect minorities from such harms. For many 
legal theorists and political philosophers, the very survival of liberal democracy rests upon 
robust state support for the rights of minorities, combined with concerted efforts to combat 
prevailing forms of racism, xenophobia and intolerance which some utterly illiberal sections 
of the population may cling to.10 One of the most disturbing features of right-wing populist 
7 William Galston, Anti-Pluralism: the Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2018). Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to 
Save It (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018). Yascha Mounk and 
The Atlantic, 26 December 2018; Jan-Werner Muller, What is Populism? 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2017). 
8 Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London: Bloomsbury, 2011). 
9 The Runnymede Trust,  London, 
April, 2020, https://www.runnymedetrust.org/blog/state-of-the-nation-new-comprehensive-analysis-on-race-
in-britain; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/race-report-healing-
divided-britain. 
10 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1977). Alan 
Patten, Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2014).  
identity politicking is the extent to which persistent tensions and prejudices surrounding 
race, ethnicity and religion amongst populations, have been mainstreamed into the political 
discourse and even the policy commitments of some governments within some liberal 
democracies. The UK provides one such example of this utterly illiberal development. 
 
Thus, evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey, published in 2019 found that 
between 1983 and 2018, the proportion of the population who describe themselves as 
 
third of the UK population.11 The figure has never fallen below 25%, and has actually 
increased since 1996. In respect of racially motivated hate crimes, UK Home Office figures 
demonstrate that racially motivated hate crime has risen every year since 2013.12  In 2018, 
71,251 such crimes were reported in England and Wales: the number of hate crimes has 
more than doubled since 2013. An extensive range of other governmental and civil society 
surveys reinforce the perception that racism and xenophobia are part of the lived realities 
of many minorities in the UK.13  
    
Of course, one might counter that, within a liberal democracy, the government cannot be 
held primarily responsible for the persistence of illiberal attitudes amongst some parts of 
the population. Indeed, the very fact that criminal sanctions exist against those who seek 
commitment to minority rights protection. However earnestly this objection is made, it 
belies the extent to which prominent UK politicians and government officials have 
 
 
The most prominent and far-reaching example of this is, of course, Brexit. While it is 
referendum were not motivated by racist and xenophobic prejudices, there is reliable 
evidence pointing to the numerically decisive role which racially and ethnically motivated 
voters played in ensuring the outcome.14 This is unsurprising given the fact that many 
politicians, public figures and several national media outlets repeatedly sought to persuade 
some voters that supporting the reassertion of a particularly restrictive notion of national 
identity was precisely what the EU referendum was concerned with. They, at least, should 
not have been surprised to see significant increases in racially and religiously motivated 
hate crime immediately prior to and following the referendum, including the terrorist murder 
of the MP, Jo Cox.   
 
Other examples of state level right-wing populist identity politicking are easy to find. Take, 
s 2012 statement that the UK 
the UK.15 The hostile environment policy was then quickly underpinned by two highly 
controversial pieces of legislation in the form of the Immigration Acts 2014 and 2016, which 
were heavily criticised by impartial bodies such as the UN Committee on the Elimination 
11 John Curtice, Elizabeth Clery, Jane Perry, Miranda Phillips and Nilufer Rahim (eds), British Social 
Attitudes: The 36th Report (London: The National Centre for Social Research, 2019).  




The Political Quarterly, 142-154. 
15  
of Racial Discrimination and, most recently, by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in 
her 2019 report on the situation in the UK.16 
Amber Rudd, then had to resign in 2018 as a direct result of the shameful Windrush 
Scandal, which amounted to little more than an instance of state racism, highlighting how 
a campaign against irregular immigrants could embroil many non-white British citizens. 
The effective mainstreaming of racist and xenophobic prejudices was also highlighted in 
the previously mentioned UN Special 
race, ethnicity, religion, gender, disability status and related categories all continue to 
determine the life chances and well-being of people in Britain in ways that are 
Kingdom explicit expressions of racial, ethnic and religious intolerance have become more 
acceptable, in ways t  
 
Immediately prior to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, it was clear that UK politics 
and society were significantly infected by profoundly harmful pathogens, which had the 





To repeat the claim I made towards the beginning of this paper, Covid-19 is not 
biochemically predisposed to infect certain identity-based groups of people. We are all of 
us exposed to the same disease. However, there are manifest inequalities in the rates of 
infection within the UK, which largely overlap existing socio-economic and identity-based 
inequalities within the wider population. Class and identity are integral aetiological 
elements of Covid-19.17  
 
Socio-economic deprivation and marginalisation appears to be the most general category 
in which the discriminatory effects of Covid-19 are most apparent. Thus, in April 2020, the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) revealed that those living in the poorest parts of 
England and Wales were dying at twice the rate of those living in the richest areas. The 
most deprived areas of England and Wales recorded 55.1 deaths per 100,000 people, 
compared with 25.3 in affluent areas.18 Of course, poverty is, to a certain extent, an 
intersectional injustice, which impacts many different racial and ethnic groups in the UK. 
Many poor and deprived white British people have also died from Covid-19. However, the 
racism and xenophobia which I set out above, serves to disproportionately consign many 
racial, ethnic and religious minorities to socio-economic vulnerability and marginalisation. 
This is apparent in the figures which show the disproportionate impact of Covid-19 upon 
many black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities in the UK. The same data 
showed that more than 16 percent of all people who had tested positive for coronavirus 
when they died were from BAME communities, despite the fact that the 2011 UK census 
16  
Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
 
17 
brunt of Covid- The Guardian, 1 May 2020. 
18 Chris Giles The Financial 
Times, 1 May 2020. 
showed that 7.5 per cent of the population were Asian and 3.3 per cent black. More 
anecdotally, it was also very noteworthy that the first ten doctors and two-thirds of the first 
100 health and social care workers who died of Covid-19 were from ethnic minorities.19 
Public Health England has produced a report examining the causes of these disparities.20  
   
There is, no doubt, be a very complex set of factors and conditions which combine to 
expose many minority communities to significantly greater risk of becoming infected and 
dying from Covid-19. Some have pointed to cultural factors, such as the relatively larger 
size of family households amongst some South Asian-descended communities, which 
make socially isolating all the more difficult. However, it is clear that one of the principal 
factors is the greater exposure of particular occupational groups to the virus. Many of us, 
including many university staff, have been able to continue working from home throughout 
the period of social lockdown. The opportunity to work from home is, one might say, a 
particular privilege which Covid-19 has underlined. Many others, of course, do not enjoy 
this privilege. So-called key or essential workers have had to continue exposing 
themselves to a far higher risk of infection as they have continued to go to work. The most 
obvious such groups are health care and social care professionals, but the category of key 
workers extends far beyond these occupational categories. Identity is significant here for 
the simple reason that racial and ethnic minority communities are disproportionately 
employed in key-worker positions. For example, more than two in ten black African women 
of working age are employed in health and social care roles. Indian men are 150% more 
likely to work in health or social care roles than their white British counterparts. While the 
Indian ethnic group makes up 3% of the working-age population of England and Wales, 
they account for 14% of doctors.21 Similar figures are also found amongst other key 
occupational groups, such as public transport and public utilities.  
 
The higher rates of infection and death from the coronavirus pandemic connect directly to 
the other pandemic I have been analysing in this chapter. Identity politicking based upon 
racism, xenophobia and intolerance are a manifestation of the social, political and 
economic marginalisation and vulnerability which many minority communities have been 
exposed to for a very considerable time and which has intensified in recent years as such 
prejudices have been mainstreamed into many areas of UK politics and society. The 
coronavirus pandemic has served to highlight the disturbingly pathological character and 




These words are being written in early June 2020 and I must acknowledge the speculative 
nature of contemplating any post-Covid age and the unavoidably tentative nature of any 
19 
2020. 
20 n the risk and outcomes of Covid-
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/890258/
disparities_review.pdf, 
row over report on UK BAME Covid- The Guardian, 4 June 2020. 
21 The Guardian, 20 April 
-
Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 2020, https://www.ifs.org.uk/inequality/chapter/are-some-ethnic-groups-
more-vulnerable-to-covid-19-than-others/. 
  
predictions regarding what changes the post-Covid world will undergo. It does, however, 
seem reasonable to assume that significant changes will occur. The question is, will the 
overwhelming evidence of the indispensable contribution BAME communities make in 
sustaining the UK during (before and after) the Covid-19 pandemic, provide a means for 
undercutting the toxic identity politicking of the pandemic of discontent within the UK? A 
change is gonna come. The question is, can those of us who care about the equal rights 
of all steer this change in the right direction? 
 
Right-wing populist identity politicking seeks to exploit long-standing socio-cultural 
differences to its own ends. Advocates of a politics which resorts to racism, xenophobia 
and intolerance seek to convert difference into hostile otherness. Further, the architects of 
right-wing populism have persistently sought to argue that the always vaguely defined 
are necessarily at odds with liberal commitments to respecting the rights of many minority 
communities.22 It is possible that this interests-based appeal will be strengthened as 
societies like the UK face the huge economic challenges which Covid-19 will entail. History 
is rife with examples of severe crises being accompanied by populations turning against 
and scapegoating marginalised communities in their midst. 
 
However, such developments are not inevitable. Periods of profound crisis also afford 
opportunities for developing radically different forms of political imagination and action. It 
is also possible to develop a very different narrative from our collective experience of 
Covid-
t 
few months. The very same racial, ethnic and religious communities who were often 
as disproportionately populating the key and essential workers the media have come to 
depict as national heroes, worthy of being applauded once a week in a national rite of 
-
amongst whom there is a massively disproportionate number of people from BAME 
communities. Thus, as of March 2019, 20% of the more than 1.2 million staff employed by 
the health service were BAME, compared with 14% of the general population of England 
and Wales. This proportion increases to 44% when it comes to medical staff. The latest 
figures show that 43% of senior NHS doctors and 47% of junior doctors were BAME as of 
March last year.23 Indeed, other evidence has unequivocally demonstrated the 
layed in 
staffing the then newly established NHS in the late 1940s and early 1950s.24 Broadly 
similar claims can be made for many of the sectors included within the other key and 
essential worker occupations, upon whom much of the entire country has depended, not 
just over the past few months, but, of course, for many decades prior to the Covid-19 
pandemic.25 Racial, ethnic and religious minorities have shown themselves to be 
22 See Muller (n. 7). 
23 The Guardian, 
3 April 2020. 
24 
Development, April 2020, https://www.mend.org.uk/overlooking-the-incredible-contributions-of-bame-staff-
in-the-nhs/. 




absolutely essential for the development and survival of British society, despite the racism 
and xenophobia which they have often had to confront.  
 
Right-wing populism draws support from across the socio-economic demographic sectors 
of the UK electorate and it is false to assume that its supporters are entirely relatively 
poorly educated and low-paid white British voters.26 There is no denying, however, that 
right-
Conservative Party have capitalised on the support of such voters.27 Right-wing populism 
has successfully depicted socio-cultural differences between white British communities 
and their BAME neighbours as, in some ill-defined sense, detrimental to the interests of 
the nation and its people. The experience of Covid-19 provides an opportunity to 
fundamentally defy and contradict this strategy, by manifestly demonstrating that the most 
vital interests of us all, staying alive and retaining some degree of socio-economic 
functioning, have been secured by countless numbers of people whom right-wing populists 
have sought to characterise as being, in effect, the enemies within. The NHS would 
collapse without BAME staff. Many of the essential services we all depend upon would 
grind to a halt without the very many BAME workers continuing to expose themselves and 
their families to greater risk of infection. BAME communities will play an absolutely 
delivered.  These irrefutable truths provide the basis for a political project of 
environment.28 
 
The, admittedly rather optimistic, position I am asserting here has, perhaps, been further 
strengthened by the ongoing response by many people to the death of George Floyd in 
the US. The death of yet another African American at the hands of US police officers has 
sparked an astonishing reaction by a wide cross-section of people who are united in their 
outrage at continuing racism in societies such as ours. Initial attempts by right-wing 
populists to gain political capital from the killing of George Floyd have been largely 
overwhelmed by a different form of popular protest, one which stands up for the human 
rights of all and is demanding radical and transformative change. This political and social 
phenomenon points to the possibility of mobilising large numbers of people in support of a 
genuinely rights-based alternative to the hateful politics of the pandemic of discontent.  A 
key aspect of politics consists of how we name the collective problems we are confronted 
by. Right wing populism has, for several years, sought to name the profoundly serious 
challenges we all face in ways which conspire to reinforce the pathologies which right-wing 
populism ultimately depends upon and which cause us so much harm and discontent. We 
now have an opportunity of renaming and thus effectively confronting the problems we 




26 onial has moved into Europe: bordering, security and ethnocultural 
2016) 54(1) Journal of Common Market Studies, 152-168. 
27 -
Institute for International Affairs, 19 December 2019, 
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-revenge-of-farage-right-wing-populism-at-the-
2019-uk-elections/. 
28 See the UN Secretary- -19  




The two pandemics I have briefly analysed in this chapter converge around socio-
economic and socio-cultural inequalities and marginalisation. Significant aspects of the 
pandemic of discontent should be understood as symptoms of a deep and underlying set 
of structural conditions that have adversely impacted broad cross-sections of British 
society. The very genuine concerns which have fuelled some aspects of right-wing populist 
identity politicking were, of course, never going to be remedied by th
prescribed by the architects of right-wing populism. In contrast, the inequalities which 
Covid-19 have cast such an uncompromising light upon offer a glimmer of hope of 
developing a new political narrative, which recognises that we really all ought to be in the 
struggle to rebuild better together, because our relationships with each other are (or can 
be) mutually interdependent and supportive. In the final analysis, we all depend upon each 
other. I fear that the collective memory of our interdependence will not last too long without 
a sustained and rights-based political project to support it. Call me a naïve optimist, but 
the lessons we might learn from the Covid-19 pandemic provide the means for fighting 
back against and perhaps even neutering the right-wing populism pathogen at the heart of 
the pandemic of discontent.  
  
